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Many Salvadorans do not vote. Abstention has been high since the late 
1980s, with only the 1994 elections surpassing a 50 percent turnout (Artiga-
González 2004). After the 1994 elections, popularly known as the “elections 
of the century” for inaugurating El Salvador’s democracy (Cruz 1998), voter 
turnout fell once again. This decreasing turnout has been interpreted as a 
symptom of disillusionment with the postwar era and lack of confi dence in 
prospects for peace (Cruz 1998; 2001). The Chapultepec Peace Accords, and 
the “transition” that followed, focused on political and institutional reforms, 
neglecting the problems of economic inequality and human rights at the root 
of the civil war. Postwar privatization of public utilities such as health care and 
water, increasing unemployment, and rising infl ation have only heightened 
economic insecurity and dependence on migrant remittances. Additionally, 
homicides and crime, which escalated after the war ended, have stabilized 
at levels so high that El Salvador ranks among the most violent countries in 
Latin America (Ramos 2000).
Despite Salvadorans’ “democratic disenchantment” (Moodie 2010, 145; 
and this volume) and skepticism about the potential of elections to effect 
change, turnout at both the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections virtually 
doubled from that of previous years (IDHUCA 2004, 23; TSE 2009). Why 
did Salvadorans vote in the 2009 elections, and participate in campaigns and 
other related events? This chapter underlines the relevance of wartime rheto-
ric and symbols to understand Salvadoran voting in 2009. More than other 
arenas of Salvadoran political life, electoral politics has recreated the divisions 
of the past, thereby reintroducing unresolved wartime frictions into public 
discourse.
The 2009 electoral campaign, I argue, allowed Salvadorans to engage—
publicly and in a relatively controlled manner—in wartime confl icts with 
which many of them had not come to terms. Recriminations and hostility 
between the governing right-wing Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) 
and the former guerrilla organization Farabundo Martí National Liberation 
Front (FMLN) have characterized the postwar elections since 1994 (Ramos 
1998), but ARENA’s mobilization of mass media propaganda to enact a 
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politics of fear in 2004 and 2009 arguably made frictions all the more pal-
pable. The question, then, is what moved so many Salvadorans to vote for the 
FMLN in the 2009 elections given ARENA’s politics of fear? The answer can 
be found in the campaign of Mauricio Funes, the 2009 FMLN presidential 
candidate. Funes attempted to transcend a Cold War divide re-enacted by 
ARENA and FMLN. He addressed pressing social and economic problems, 
appealing to both the left and the right.
Fieldwork in Santiago Nonualco before, during, and after the presidential 
elections held on 15 March 2009 provided insights into how Salvadorans 
perceived and experienced this postwar election. Santiago is a municipio (mu-
nicipality) in the south-central La Paz Department. The population of this 
rural area practices subsistence agriculture and works in commerce or in the 
maquila factories in the region’s offshore El Pedregal zone. Though not 
considered a former war zone, Santiago nonetheless refl ects the nation’s his-
torical wartime divisions. During the electoral campaign, I attended meetings 
and rallies of all political parties, held informal conversations with their lead-
ers and constituents, and participated as an international observer on Election 
Day. Given the heightened animosities characterizing this election, informal 
conversations about electoral politics cropped up constantly in mundane situ-
ations and among people not formally involved in the campaigns.
To some degree, Santiago can be seen as a microcosm of the polarized 
confl ict that persisted in the country during the 2009 presidential elections. 
Interestingly, since 2000, Santiago has been governed by the National Con-
ciliation Party (PCN), once the dominant military party but now a minor-
ity party that has served chiefl y as a supporter of ARENA in the Legislative 
Assembly.1 The differences in how people cast their votes in municipal and 
presidential elections are symptomatic of a disjuncture between the citizen-
ship practices that concern the polity of the municipio and those of the nation 
(see Stack 2003). In other words, while haunting Cold War imageries and 
memories may patently impact national citizenship, their infl uence is more 
limited during the municipal elections of a place like Santiago, where a third 
party governs. Although the PCN’s presence does yield a difference between 
municipal and presidential elections, the study of municipal elections is be-
yond the scope of this chapter.
In the Absence of a Public Discussion
The 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords that marked the end of El Salvador’s 
twelve-year war included the creation of a Truth Commission to investigate 
and point to those responsible for wartime human rights violations.2 Its 1993 
report included basic information on certain high-profi le cases, such as the 
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El Mozote massacre and Archbishop Romero’s assassination (United Na-
tions 1993). It asserted that in order for Salvadorans to reconcile, further 
investigations on human rights violations were required—although the re-
port was not explicit about how this should be done. These investigations 
would in turn provide the grounds for moral reparation and adequate mate-
rial compensation.
Immediately after the commission’s recommendations were put forward, 
El Salvador’s ARENA government, headed by President Alfredo Cristiani, 
passed the 1993 Amnesty Law that precluded accountability for war crimes. 
Since then, consistent efforts to bring the past back into the public domain 
have been rare and limited to the work by El Salvador’s human rights orga-
nizations (though see Binford, this volume, which discusses efforts to in-
corporate historical memory of the war into tourism and museums in the 
northeastern department of Morazán). The country’s two major political par-
ties, ARENA and FMLN, which represent the war’s opposing sides, have not 
facilitated a public discussion that might provide a forum for reconciliation. 
Only during electoral periods have ARENA and FMLN publicly addressed 
the war’s causes. Their explanations, however, have been stereotypical and 
caricatured.
Not only has the absence of a public discussion about the civil war pre-
cluded retributive and restorative justice, but some would argue that it has 
also allowed the government to avoid tackling the socioeconomic problems 
at the root of the war. The Peace Accords focused on demilitarization. They 
only secondarily addressed economic reform. Indeed, as the Peace Accords 
explicitly assert, “The general philosophy or orientation of the Government’s 
economic policy, which FMLN does not necessarily share, is not covered by 
this Agreement” (United Nations 1992, 31). In emphasizing the dissolution 
of military rule, the accords implicitly defi ned democracy narrowly. In short, 
the democracy laid out by the Peace Accords was procedural, defi ned chiefl y 
by civil and political citizenship entitlements. The ARENA governments ad-
opted a neoliberal agenda, along with the rest of Central America at the 
cusp of the new millennium, as many chapters in this volume demonstrate; 
these parallel transformations that blended political and economic freedoms 
yielded a “free-market democracy” (see Moodie 2010, 41–45; Binford, this 
volume).
My focus in this chapter is on what an election can tell us about aspects of 
Salvadoran politics that are often invisible in everyday life (much as Raventós’s 
account of the Costa Rican referendum in this volume reveals about that 
country’s politics). In El Salvador, memories and experiences of the war usu-
ally delineate basic party constituencies in such a way that postwar elections 
represent expressions of historical divisions and confl icts that do not manifest 
in other circumstances (see R. Montoya, this volume, for an account of how 
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symbolic uses of recent history have mobilized Sandinista performance in 
Nicaragua). Even so, the victory of the FMLN in the 2009 presidential elec-
tions has to be explained. Mauricio Funes, the FMLN candidate, was able to 
temper the wartime divide while addressing long overlooked socio-economic 
problems of ordinary people.
Postwar Elections as War
Both FMLN and ARENA have basic constituencies rooted in wartime and 
maintained through the postwar reproduction of a historical divide. In San-
tiago, in the 2009 elections, party allegiances in a cantón (territory within a 
municipal unit) were predicated upon war experiences and family ties. The 
central barrios and northern cantón Las Ánimas, where the population was 
repressed during the war, massively supported the FMLN. The remaining 
northern cantones, where people had joined paramilitary groups, clearly sup-
ported ARENA. Party allegiance echoed throughout the landscape with mu-
rals, fl ags, and candidate portraits. Housefronts, entrance doors, lampposts, 
the pavement, and even trees were decorated either in the red of the FMLN 
or the blue-white-red of ARENA. Just as Salvadorans supported FMLN or 
ARENA on the basis of their wartime experiences, the parties’ leaderships 
devised electoral strategies that resonated with war tactics. These include a 
fi xation with territorial control; death threats, confrontations and physical 
aggressions perpetrated on the basis of party allegiances; secrecy and rumor 
about spies; and a denial of neutrality, ambiguity, and middle positions.
Territory was critical in all parties’ strategizing. Both FMLN and ARENA 
were structured locally around a hierarchical leadership that was decentral-
ized via the establishment of support groups or leaders in barrios and can-
tones. This structure already existed in areas where the parties enjoyed large 
basic constituencies but had to be created anew for the 2009 elections in 
others. While the FMLN sought to found “base committees” in each sector, 
ARENA identifi ed specifi c leaders supportive of its party who would man-
age to attract other residents. In both party’s meetings, discussions revolved 
around the barrios and cantones that each party controlled, where FMLN 
base committees or ARENA leaders were located, and what strategies should 
be devised vis-à-vis those in control of the opposing party. The dispute over 
territory became evident in the competition between parties to cover streets, 
houses, and roads with their colors; often one party’s contingent painted 
and plastered a street or road during the day, only to have members of the 
opposing party paint or plaster over their work that night. In previous elec-
tions, FMLN and ARENA loyalists had clashed in the same way (La Prensa 
Gráfi ca 1999).3
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Physical aggression was not absent during 2009. Several FMLN mem-
bers told me that as they were trying to found a base committee for the fi rst 
time in the northern cantón San Antonio Arriba in September 2007, three 
hooded men attacked their leader. Other neighbors who showed an interest 
in the FMLN received death threats. FMLN members were confi dent that 
these were ARENA attacks. One explained, “The two San Antonios, Arriba 
and Abajo, and Santa Cruz Loma are all areneros (ARENA loyalists), so it is 
dangerous for us to set foot there dressed in our red T-shirts. Until 2007, the 
FMLN leadership had not tried to visit these cantones during the electoral 
campaigns. It was there that the Comandos Chencho Beltrán (death squads) 
were active during the war.” 4
During FMLN meetings, rumors constantly circulated about the persecu-
tion or assassination of party members. At one such gathering, a police offi cer 
who had befriended members of the local FMLN leadership told them that 
news had arrived at his sub-delegation about cars and taxis that had been 
seen driving around the department of La Libertad without license plates and 
whose drivers had been hired to assassinate FMLN members. He provided 
details of the colors and designs of the reported vehicles so that people could 
watch out for themselves. In the face of this kind of threat, bolstered by the 
feelings of insecurity stemming from the homicidal violence that makes the 
Figure 2.1. Salvadoran Election Poster, 2009, Ainhoa Montoya
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daily news in postwar El Salvador, FMLN members either walked home in 
groups after meetings or, more often, dropped each other off in pick-up 
trucks. Several FMLN loyalists confessed to me their fear of participating in 
political activity during elections.
Secrecy also characterized both the 2009 electoral campaign and wartime. 
Both ARENA and FMLN leaders were suspicious of people they did not 
know or trust who attended meetings. They became fi xated on the possibil-
ity that the opposing party was infi ltrating their meetings, or that someone 
from within their own leadership was disclosing information about electoral 
strategies. This distrust was not groundless, since all parties gathered intel-
ligence, partly on the basis of rumor but also based on the information pro-
vided by the members sent to the meetings of the opposing party. Even with 
their own relatives, party loyalists tended to remain secretive about electoral 
strategies; the same occurred during the war, when, as some women told me, 
their own husbands would not share information concerning political and 
military activity.
No one conceived of neutrality as a possibility. Santiagueños often knew 
their neighbors’ and relatives’ allegiances or thought they could guess them. 
Even I was sometimes viewed with suspicion. The ARENA leadership as-
sumed that I sided with the FMLN because my host family supported this 
party. The family’s house was decorated with a poster of Funes and an FMLN 
fl ag, visible from the street, hung from a tall mango tree in the backyard. Sev-
eral times I was publicly accused in ARENA meetings of having been sent by 
the Venezuelan and Cuban governments in order to gather information. Nor 
was I free from suspicion from the FMLN leadership, given my scrupulous 
silence about what I had heard at ARENA meetings. I thus had to repeatedly 
justify why I was interested in the elections. I was as open as possible about 
my attendance at the public meetings of all parties, and I avoided leadership 
meetings to which I had been invited so as not to raise suspicions.
On more than one occasion I was chided by friends who supported the 
FMLN for interacting with a member of an ARENA-affi liated family. This 
happened when I was returning from an event at the Jesuit Central American 
University (UCA) in San Salvador in a microbus crammed with university 
students. I spent the journey chatting with two 20-year-old girls who had 
seen me in Santiago and were curious about what I was doing there, since 
that municipio is rarely visited by foreigners. A friend accompanying me, an 
FMLN loyalist, remained silent during the journey. When we got off in San-
tiago, he explained the two girls were from ARENA families and admonished 
me for having told them details about myself.
An examination of political parties’ strategizing during the 2009 electoral 
campaigns shows not only the continuing salience of wartime divisions, but 
also the extent to which FMLN and ARENA were apparently mirror images 
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of one another. Looking solely at the symbolic and performative elements of 
electoral competition, one could infer that El Salvador’s postwar elections 
had become a struggle unto themselves, in which both sides mimicked the 
other while the motivation at the root of confl ict had dissipated. During the 
war, both ARENA and FMLN were arguably the products of a fusion of 
political and military elements. The FMLN structured itself as an army yet 
originated in mass political organizations. ARENA publicly presented itself 
as being protected by its own army (Martín-Baró 1991, 298). In addition, 
ARENA has been linked to wartime death squads (United Nations 1993, 
184-86). Obviously the two parties differed radically in ideology. Tracing the 
genealogy and ideological underpinnings of the two main political parties in 
the country’s postwar era can thus shed light on the frictions between their 
basic constituencies.
The FMLN, born in 1980 as a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla organization, 
united the fi ve main revolutionary political-military groups of the 1970s in 
an effort to wage a “fi nal offensive” against the Salvadoran state in 1981 that 
turned out to be merely one of the events precipitating the country’s twelve-
year civil war. The FMLN converted to a legal political party with the 1992 
Peace Accords. Its supporters largely comprise ex-guerrillas as well as mem-
bers of social movements and popular organizations. Since its transforma-
tion, the FMLN has become ARENA’s main electoral rival.
ARENA was founded in 1981 and gained the presidency in 1989. A na-
tionalist, anti-communist and pro-capitalist party, ARENA responded to the 
interests of the fraction of the elite dissatisfi ed with the reformist Christian 
Democratic Party (PDC)-led junta erected in 1979, especially its implemen-
tation of agrarian reform (Martín-Baró 1991). After the war, it expanded its 
original agro-fi nancial constituency into rural areas where paramilitary groups 
had been active or where it successfully developed patron-client relationships. 
While ARENA has promoted neoliberal economic measures conducive to 
consolidating accumulation by the country’s elite, the FMLN, as stated in its 
charter, originally aimed to transform the status quo radically via the estab-
lishment of a socialist state (see FMLN 2006). In practice, however, inter-
necine divisions between orthodox and reformist wings have dissipated the 
party’s goals.
Given the war re-enactment and attendant emotions that so pervaded the 
2009 elections, Salvadorans’ party loyalties and electoral participation were 
chiefl y motivated by their war positionality and experience. During 2009, 
many young people participated in both parties’ campaigns in Santiago. In 
general, they joined the parties to which their elder kin were loyal. They 
readily embraced the party symbols and outward signs. Still, ideologies were 
relevant, though reformulated to the present-day conjuncture. FMLN lead-
ers have continued to issue systemic and class-based explanations for Salva-
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dorans’ economic predicaments. Yet, in their 2009 program, both local and 
national FMLN leadership conspicuously avoided addressing questions of so-
cialism, strategically distancing the party from its guerrilla face. By contrast, 
ARENA leaders disseminated a fi erce anti-communism, predicated upon the 
alleged risk that the FMLN would establish a totalitarian regime like those of 
Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba.
The Politics of Fear and Memory: 
The Wartime Divide Updated
A “campaign of fear” orchestrated by ARENA and waged via mass media 
characterized the 2004 presidential elections (García Dueñas 2006; Wolf 
2009, 447–54). This campaign was rooted in two threatening scenarios that 
ARENA claimed would materialize if the FMLN won: fi rst, the consolidation 
of a communist regime, and, second, the enactment by the United States gov-
ernment of a policy prohibiting Salvadorans in the United States from sending 
remittances to El Salvador (García Dueñas 2006). The invoking of a commu-
nist threat was hardly new; this strategy had been widely deployed by the Sal-
vadoran governments during the pre-war and war years—when El Salvador 
became a Cold War battleground—to legitimize counterinsurgency violence 
that often targeted civilians (see Binford 1996). Recourse to “the communist 
threat” can be traced all the way back to El Salvador’s 1932 peasant rebellion, 
which the government blamed on the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS), 
and the army’s ensuing repression of 10,000 peasants (Alvarenga 2006; An-
derson 1971; Gould and Lauria-Santiago 2008; López Bernal 2007). In the 
2004 elections the communist threat was updated to coincide with ordinary 
Salvadorans’ present-day concerns, such as remittances, while maintaining 
long-lived imageries. This confl ation of calculative and affective elements in a 
politics of fear also characterized the 2009 presidential elections.
ARENA leaders’ use of the term “communism” is vague enough to en-
compass anyone and anything that threatens the country’s status quo and elite 
interests (Martín-Baró 1991, 296). During the 2004 and 2009 campaigns, 
ARENA’s anti-communist rhetoric insinuated that the FMLN sought to es-
tablish a totalitarian and military state in the event of a victory in the presi-
dential elections. The effectiveness of this rhetoric on the rural population 
was evident in the visits that I paid to FMLN constituents to the cantones in 
Santiago during the 2009 electoral campaign. Especially where residents had 
participated in paramilitary groups during the war, people were often quite 
hostile to visitors from the former guerrilla party. A barefoot woman in her 
70s who received the FMLN leaders at the entrance of her adobe house in 
San Antonio Abajo did not want to hear their explanations about their party’s 
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electoral program. She declared emphatically that she knew what the FMLN 
would do if they won:
I have heard that we will be given a single dress and a single pair of shoes. 
And it doesn’t matter if they are not our size because we won’t be given any 
more of them. I am poor but I do have a few dresses. I also have my own 
house, and I know that I will have to share it with another family if they 
win. I also know what they intend to do with the old people, just because 
we are no longer able to work like the young people. And the coupons—we 
will be rationed and given weapons as during the war. What can you expect 
of the people who destroyed the country during the war?
This woman’s statement exemplifi es how the symbolic and discursive strat-
egies of ARENA leaders percolated through to ordinary Salvadorans and 
alienated them from the FMLN.
The hostility against FMLN constituents and manifest fear of commu-
nism prevalent in areas of northern Santiago stemmed partly from ARENA’s 
deployment of Cold War rhetoric at public meetings during the campaign. 
ARENA’s public meetings, held Sundays, were attended mainly by men and 
women in their fi fties and sixties, most of them peasants. Men wearing peas-
ant hats and women in aprons predominated, their garb indicative of their 
humble origins. Every meeting began with ARENA’s anthem, which every-
one had to sing with his or her right fi st raised so as to avoid accusations of 
being an FMLN spy or showing insuffi cient enthusiasm. The anthem ex-
presses hostility against FMLN members: El Salvador será la tumba donde los 
rojos terminarán (El Salvador will be the grave where the reds [FMLN]—will 
end). Speeches by ARENA leaders then would describe how FMLN guerril-
las had destroyed the country through attacks on pylons, bridges, and other 
infrastructure. These speeches also portrayed the FMLN as a present-day 
and future threat given the party’s alleged alignment with Hugo Chávez and 
Fidel Castro. As a local ARENA leader said at a weekly meeting:
Why is communism so interested in El Salvador? Because this is a country of 
development. ARENA supports agriculture, the church, sports … ARENA 
is the party of peace, freedom and progress. We live in a democracy but 
let’s make good use of this democracy. Let’s give our children a free coun-
try like the one we have enjoyed. If we do not defend ourselves, we might 
be in great danger. The FMLN will hand over the country to Chávez. We 
should not make the same mistake as the Nicaraguans, who are now slaves 
of Venezuela and Cuba. These elections have to make history. We need to 
fi ght for a fi fth ARENA government that allows for a perpetuation of free-
dom and democracy. You are the soldiers who must defend peace against 
the threat of international communism, which is the origin of the current 
economic crisis. ARENA promotes freedom, economic development, and 
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foreign investment. The FMLN only wants war. The change proclaimed by 
the FMLN is one of war and communism. (emphasis added)
ARENA’s electoral strategy hinged upon a Manichaean representation of 
postwar political life in which the FMLN epitomized threat, destruction, 
totalitarianism, economic collapse, and violence. By contrast, ARENA was 
depicted as righteous, involved in the reconstruction of postwar El Salvador, 
and a guarantor of freedom and democracy. Democracy, in the rhetoric of 
ARENA leaders, is the antithesis of communism; it allows the individual free-
dom to hold private property and undertake profi t-driven economic activity.
In ARENA’s depiction, political change was equivalent to an ostensible 
threat to all postwar achievements: democracy, freedom, and private prop-
erty. For instance, in February 2009, following the closure of several ma-
quilas in El Pedregal and the consequent loss of thousands of jobs, rumors 
spread that these changes had occurred in response to the prospect of an 
FMLN president. Indeed, during the electoral campaign, the threat of disin-
vestment in the event of an FMLN victory was consistently raised. ARENA 
leaders reminded Santiagueños that even if they were poor, the fact that they 
owned anything at all was a result of their own party’s governance. According 
to ARENA rhetoric, their possessions might well be taken away by a com-
munist FMLN government. Violence was thus legitimized and encouraged 
in the event of an FMLN victory.
This rhetoric cannot be considered a mere strategic ploy. On 26 October 
2008, when I met with the fi fteen men and one woman of the local ARENA 
leadership in Santiago to explain my interest in attending their meetings, 
some seemed genuinely concerned about the prospect of an FMLN victory. 
After I had described the details of my research and addressed their concerns, 
a man in his late 30s told me: “Everything you have explained to us seems 
reasonable to me, but you have to understand that our worries are not un-
founded. Our country is under the threat of communism, so we cannot trust 
anyone right now.”
The major mass media, mostly pro-ARENA, have played a fundamental 
role in drawing attention to the threat allegedly posed by the FMLN to the 
Salvadoran nation and eliciting fear. In the 2009 campaign, on El Salvador’s 
television channels 2, 4, and 6 (all owned by the same ARENA-linked media 
mogul, Boris Esersky), daily advertisements asserted both the violent nature 
of the FMLN and the alliance between FMLN presidential candidate Mau-
ricio Funes and the Venezuelan government—an alliance so strong that the 
country would be handed over to Hugo Chávez in the event of an FMLN 
victory. One of these TV ads suggested the following:
Mauricio Funes is a presidential candidate backed by the FMLN, a com-
munist party and an ally of Hugo Chávez. Chávez is the number one enemy 
of the United States. The United States is an ally of El Salvador. Millions of 
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Salvadorans live there, send their remittances and thousands have benefi ted 
from the TPS.5 Therefore, if Funes and the FMLN take offi ce we will be 
subjected to Chávez. Your remittances and the TPS are in danger. In dan-
ger are your freedom, your job, and prices will truly rise sky high. Risky? It 
is more than that. Funes and the FMLN are a danger for your pocketbook 
and a real danger for El Salvador. (emphasis added)
These advertisements were either anonymous or signed by the organization 
Fuerza Solidaria, heretofore unknown in El Salvador, which originated in 
Venezuela to delegitimize Chávez’s government. Associations were made in 
these ads between the FMLN and the Venezuelan, Cuban, and Nicaraguan 
governments and even Islamist terrorism.6 
On 13 December 2008 the newspaper La Prensa Gráfi ca reported that 
the Salvadoran Ministry of Defense was investigating the existence of armed 
groups in different parts of the country, mostly FMLN strongholds (2008). 
Concrete details were offered to lend credibility to the charges: “At the co-
ordinates 13º59’07.7” North and 89º13’34.76” West is an area of military 
training, northeast of the Cinotepeque mountain, in the jurisdiction of El 
Paisnal, a zone under territorial and military control by the Popular Libera-
tion Forces (FPL) during the war” (La Prensa Gráfi ca 2008a). This news 
precipitated a widespread discussion in the country’s mass media about the 
ties between these alleged armed groups and the FMLN. Photos of a com-
memoration held annually on 12 and 13 December in the municipio El Pais-
nal, in the San Salvador department, to pay homage to the deceased guerrilla 
Commander Dimas Rodríguez, were published by the media. In this com-
memoration ex-guerrillas simulated a military march dressed in uniform and 
carrying plastic or defunct rifl es. The media and ARENA used the presence of 
FMLN members in the photos of this military march simulacrum as evidence 
that FMLN was arming and training new guerrilla groups.
“The FBI and Interpol could help us with the technical and scientifi c in-
vestigation.” These were the words of the country’s attorney general regard-
ing the issue of armed groups. “We need to have scientifi c verifi cation that 
the photographs are authentic in order to sustain a potential accusation” (El 
Diario de Hoy 2008). The insistence on the scientifi c nature of the investiga-
tion seemed to aim at depoliticizing the issue in the eyes of the Salvadoran 
public. According to the right-wing media, the investigation simply sought 
to verify the existence of organizations receiving paramilitary training with 
the goal of destabilizing the state. Although the ARENA government sug-
gested that the gravity of the issue was such that it had to be reported to 
international organizations, after a few days of front-page coverage the issue 
was dropped (La Prensa Gráfi ca 2008b).
In Santiago, incidents in the municipio were interpreted in the light of this 
news. A relative of my host family recounted to me a rumor that had spread 
throughout the cantón San Sebastián Abajo, where she lived. According to 
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the rumor, guerrillas might well have been training in Santiago’s mountain-
ous cantones since residents had seen armed men not from the area. The mass 
media’s coverage of the FMLN had thus managed to sow seeds of doubt 
about the nature of this party’s political project.
In 2004 and 2009, ARENA resorted to a politics of fear and memory to 
counter its eroding hegemony—erosion rooted in the unfulfi lled promises 
of the Peace Accords and aggravated by the impact of neoliberal economic 
policy. It also aimed to demonstrate the quality of the Salvadoran democracy 
to an international community less supportive of overt counterinsurgency 
violence than it had been during the 1980s, when the United States provided 
fi nancial, military, and moral backing to the Salvadoran government. What is 
distinctive about the Salvadoran case is the prominence of Cold War rhetoric 
in the country’s postwar electoral politics in an era when such rhetoric has 
waned from both international and Latin American politics. Although the 
left/right divide is still widely invoked in Latin America, it has become associ-
ated with new ideologies, such as Chávez’s “twenty-fi rst century socialism.”
Aside from the performative aspects described in the above section, which 
largely refl ect war experiences, ARENA’s politics of fear also put emotions 
to work in specifi c ways (compare with Ahmed 2004). ARENA’s free-fl oat-
ing signifi er of “the communist” slid sideways among FMLN guerrillas, the 
Cuban, Venezuelan, and Nicaraguan regimes, and Islamist terrorists. The 
country’s right-wing media and ARENA leadership also deployed historical 
and contemporary associations of “threat,” “danger,” “war,” and “terrorism” 
that increased the affective value of the communist threat. Those signs in 
circulation during elections became commonplace currency for Salvadorans 
across the political spectrum. El Salvador’s 2009 elections constituted one 
of the few occasions on which Salvadorans publicly aired wartime frictions; 
yet discussion was limited by campaign rhetoric and political ideologies. Of 
course, war memories were not elicited to promote dialogue, but rather to 
evoke fear, exacerbate hostilities, and gain electoral advantage. During the 
2004 and 2009 elections, discussion about the parties’ economic agendas 
was eclipsed by the politics of fear that was at work. The heightened animosi-
ties, largely stemming from ARENA’s politics of fear, stimulated the vote of 
many disaffected Salvadorans in both 2004 and 2009.
Building a Middle
If the re-enactment of war and ARENA’s politics of fear explain the doubling 
of voter turnout in 2004 and again in 2009, what was different about the 
2009 presidential elections that allowed for the FMLN victory? The 2009 re-
sults cannot be fully understood from within the paradigm of a rigid national 
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political divide. During the 2009 campaign, Mauricio Funes, the FMLN 
presidential candidate, addressed the economic and social concerns of ordi-
nary Salvadorans, minimizing wartime political cleavages and appealing to 
Salvadorans across the political spectrum. Indeed, Funes had not militated in 
the FMLN until his candidacy. A charismatic left-wing journalist and human 
rights advocate, Funes was well known for the Salvadoran TV news programs 
he hosted for more than twenty years. From the moment his candidacy was 
announced in 2007 he stressed both symbolically and literally the distinction 
between him and the party. He tried to maintain a degree of autonomy vis-à-
vis the party. Funes never appeared in public dressed in the FMLN’s red color 
or raised his left fi st and sang the party anthem at political rallies.
In contrast to the FMLN’s ubiquitous identifi cation with the Venezuelan 
and Cuban governments, Funes repeatedly declared his predilection for Bra-
zilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s governance style and for Brazilian-
style participatory democracy. Like Lula, he sought to continue neoliberal 
policies while developing a social agenda to lessen the impact of these policies 
on the poor. In a speech delivered during a visit to Santiago on 10 March 
2009, Funes stressed his commitment to stabilizing the prices of basic goods, 
generating jobs, facilitating access to and improvement of basic utilities such 
as running water, expanding the pension and health care systems, and provid-
ing credit and assistance to those working the land as well as social housing 
and other subsidies for poor families. All of these were concerns for largely 
rural municipios like Santiago.
In a further attempt to distance Funes from the FMLN, the association 
Amigos de Mauricio was founded. This association, which included former 
right-wing advocates and high-ranking ex-military offi cials, attempted to 
build up the virtually nonexistent middle in the Salvadoran political spec-
trum. In Santiago, a former military offi cial belonging to this association ac-
companied the FMLN departmental deputy Gerson Martínez on his tour of 
the La Paz Department municipios. In every stop, the former military offi cial 
explained to audiences that he had fought with the army during the war but 
that he was supporting the FMLN in 2009 because ARENA had failed to 
generate economic prosperity. He denied that the military was unanimously 
supporting ARENA, even though that party’s leaders had tried to demon-
strate so by marching with members of El Salvador’s Veterans Association 
“General Manuel José Arce” (ASVEM) on San Salvador streets on 7 Septem-
ber 2008, the day of ASVEM’s fi fth anniversary.
ARENA maintained that Funes’s distinction from FMLN was a rhetori-
cal ploy. Ultimately, ARENA claimed, Funes remained fi rmly allied with the 
FMLN and Hugo Chávez. While ARENA simply denied the possibility of 
a middle position, the FMLN managed it in a contradictory fashion. The 
public endorsement of Funes by former military offi cials during the campaign 
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benefi ted the FMLN insofar as it demonstrated that sectors traditionally op-
posed to the party now supported it. But the FMLN leadership, dominated 
by the orthodox wing of the party, consistently sought to minimize the dis-
tance that Funes had established between himself and the party. In this sense, 
both ARENA and the FMLN contributed to the increasingly polarized phys-
iognomy of the Salvadoran political spectrum.
The immutability of the divide in the 2009 elections was thus more an 
effect of ARENA’s and FMLN’s mimicked reproduction of the divide than 
an actual feature of it. This was evidenced by the FMLN victory in the 2009 
elections, which many observers believe refl ected among other things Fu-
nes’s successful building of a middle position, despite both parties’ efforts to 
deny or co-opt this possibility. Indeed, on my visits with FMLN members to 
the northern rural areas of Santiago, where the population is predominantly 
right-wing, I encountered middle-aged men and women who declared, “I 
am giving my vote to Funes but not to the FMLN.” Some went on to explain 
that while they did not trust the FMLN, they would vote for Funes, who 
seemed like a decent man, owing to the country’s dire economic situation. 
I would thus argue that Funes received massive support from the electorate 
by transcending the Cold War divide re-enacted by ARENA and FMLN. 
Instead, he proposed concrete programs to address the pressing social and 
economic problems that had been sidestepped by the Peace Accords and 
eclipsed by ARENA’s politics of fear. In so doing, he promised to satisfy or-
dinary Salvadorans’ aspirations to an expanded vision of democracy.
Conclusion
El Salvador’s 2009 presidential elections foregrounded the persistence of war 
legacies and confl icts, expressed in anachronistic Cold War imageries and 
rhetoric. These legacies were mobilized by political elites anxious to maintain 
their privilege through the promotion of neoliberal policies. Yet these legacies 
persist in Salvadorans’ everyday relationships and lives partly because there 
has been no public discussion of the war beyond political strategizing or that 
recognizes the ambiguities of the wartime divide and its attached moralities. 
The resuscitation of wartime confrontations during the 2009 campaign al-
lowed ARENA to avoid a public discussion of pressing economic issues and 
counter the erosion of the party’s hegemony.
Funes’s middle position was crucial in determining the FMLN victory in 
2009. His charisma, along with his non-participation in the country’s civil 
war (and the massively funded FMLN campaign) allowed for a revaluation, 
even by disaffected and disillusioned Salvadorans, of the belligerent image of 
the FMLN. This revaluation was also made possible by Funes’s direct address 
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of the social and economic problems that had been consistently overlooked 
through the consolidation of a “free-market democracy.”
Notes
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 1. The PCN was the military’s offi cial party since its founding in 1961. Elections were then 
observed by El Salvador’s military governments as a means to gain legitimacy but were also 
manipulated when necessary, as in 1972 and 1977 (Stanley 1996). After the 1979 coup 
d’état, the PCN became a minority party. It was recently disbanded (2011) because it had 
not garnered enough votes. 
 2. For a critical view on Truth Commissions, see Laplante and Theidon (2007) and Wilson 
(2001).
 3. The most notable case of inter-party violence occurred during the 2004 presidential elec-
tions, when two ARENA members were killed while mounting party propaganda (La Prensa 
Gráfi ca 2004).
 4. Chencho Beltrán was well known in Santiago for having led a local death squad and or-
chestrated numerous assassinations during the early 1980s, until his group was attacked by 
guerrillas in 1985.
 5. The Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program that grants legal residency in the United 
States to 260,000 Salvadorans was revived by the U.S. government in March 2001, after 
the two earthquakes that devastated El Salvador, and has since been successively extended 
(PNUD 2005). Yet the TPS creates a sort of “legal limbo,” given that those benefi ting from 
it cannot leave the United States and live with the uncertainty that stems from not receiv-
ing a resolution to their status (PNUD 2005, 432–33). Its temporary nature explains why 
ARENA has deployed the recission of TPS as a threat during presidential elections.
 6. See, for instance, the documentaries “Hugo Chávez: Una amenaza real” and “No entre-
guemos El Salvador,” which are available at http://fuerzasolidaria.org/?p=583 and http://
fuerzasolidaria.org/?p=723 (accessed 30 September 2011). These documentaries were 
shown on Salvadoran TV and at ARENA’s political rallies.
